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Abstract— All companies have goals or targets as well as 
projections for various metrics.  External and internal 
environmental factors, more often than not, push a company off 
course.  This tendency, when a company strays from the optimal 
projected path, is called the Path/Goal problem.  In the course of 
this paper, a framework will be constructed for managers to 
visualize their current position and path, with regard to their goals, 
competitors and environment. The framework will also provide 
insight for making decisions and crafting strategy.  Furthermore, 
this paper will discuss and quantify when a course change (pivot) 
should be considered by evaluating the nature of the distribution of 
possible outcomes at any given point in time.  The framework will 
then be used to contrast incumbent firms versus new entrants to a 
market as well as continuous versus discontinuous technological 
innovation strategies.  More importantly, the framework will 
demonstrate how these situations relate to a company’s path toward 
their end goal.  The final discussion will focus on strategies as well 
as their implications and risks with the goal of helping managers 
not only understand their situational environment, but also the 
implications of their decisions.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 All companies or Strategic Business Units (SBU) have 
goals of one type or another. These can be strategic or tactical 
in nature. If the firm has been planning properly, then they 
have a projected or estimated plan or path to reach their goals. 
The problem is, reality is often very different than the plan. 
When the inevitable happens and the firm finds itself off track, 
most managers will try to correct the path (pivot). While some 
do this successfully, others do not. This is called the path/goal 
problem and, this paper will build a framework that highlights 
the dynamics of this situation and provide an outline to 
visualize the problem, thus enabling managers to make better 
decisions. 
II. THE PATH/GOAL MODEL 
 
Let us start by looking at a typical situation involving some 
type of target, such as revenue, installed base or production 
levels.  While all are common goals established by firms across 
industries, any metric will serve for the purposes of the 
framework.  Figure 1, the True North Plot, is a graphical 
representation of a typical situation in which one knows where 
the starting point and the goal are.  As the figure shows, the 
shortest course to take is a straight line connecting these two 
points.  
However, the course represented by the straight line is only 
a best or initial estimate in an ideal climate.  In fact, this course 
may not be navigable due to the presence of many unforeseen 
factors as well as errors in the projections.  As a result, the 
actual course will be different than the ideal course due to the 








Because the straight line is merely based on the assumption 
of a stable set of external and internal conditions, which all 
vary across industries and firms [1], the actual course will 
differ from the ideal straight line.  In Figure 1, the actual path 
taken is represented by the blue line and is based on the 
progress toward the goal as evaluated at the points P1 and 
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P2.  While this path function is continuous in nature, it is 
represented as discrete for simplicity.  Thomke [2] contends 
that taking a straight-line course of action does not work well 
in external environments that consist of continuously shifting 
dynamics.  This assertion further complicates the decision 
making process, because it calls into question the reliability of 
the assumptions.    
Environmental factors considered external to the firm 
include, but are not limited to, aspects of the competitive, 
political, technological, ecological and legal landscapes. 
Whereas, internal environmental factors include, but are not 
limited to, patterns of communication, knowledge flows, 
process and work routines existing within the firm [1]. When 
looking forward in time, the situation is best represented as a 
distribution of potential outcomes rather than a discrete value. 
This distribution is based on the inevitable uncertainties that 
accompany environmental dynamics and is a representation of 
several different courses, depending on the probability of the 
outcomes of external and internal factors. The situation that 
results is in itself a challenge for decision makers. This 
challenge is with the distribution’s unknown shape and 
characteristics.  However, establishing a reasonable confidence 
interval can serve as a boundary of where the expected 
outcome rests and is hypothesized to facilitate the decision 
making process and address this challenge accordingly.  
The confidence interval in this context will be defined as 
Outcome Boundaries (OB), which are graphically displayed as 
the two red lines that share a common endpoint at each point of 
evaluation of the function in Figure 1. These OBs define all 
potential outcomes within the confidence intervals. For 
example, if a confidence interval of two standard deviations is 
used, then the OBs will define the actual outcome with a 
confidence of 95%.  In figure 1, OBs for three points in time 
have been notated.  Additionally, OBs do not tell us if one path, 
or course of action, is statistically favored over an alternative 
path within the boundaries of the outcomes distribution. What 
they do tell us is that the actual path will most likely reside 
between the OBs within a known confidence interval.  
Another way of quantifying this relationship is to consider 
the angle defined by the two OBs. This angle, referred to as ζ 
(Zeta), is illustrated as such in Figure 1.  ζ is a measure of 
uncertainty and risk at a given point in time as represented by 
the distribution of outcomes.  In other words, the larger the ζ, 
the bigger the uncertainty and range of possible outcomes. 
Because the distribution of outcomes may not be symmetrical 
around any given position, ζ likely will not be centered on the 
best guess or projection. 
Establishing OBs and ζ provides a useful tool for 
visualizing and quantifying the degree of knowledge and 
uncertainty at a given point in time. Furthermore, as time 
passes and progression along a given path occurs, the 
progression of success relative to the goal can be evaluated. 
Graphically, the actual path, as displayed in Figure 1, is a blue 
line whose length is proportional to the time elapse. As many 
decision makers know, the actual outcome of a given situation 
tends to be something other than the outcome originally 
projected. The difference in the actual outcome from the 
anticipated outcome is a reflection of the uncertainty that 
occurred during the time period. 
The need for path changes can occur because of an internal 
or external force. An internal change can either be intentional 
or unintentional, and is related to something internal to the 
firm.  Each time a path change occurs, a new set of OBs and a 
new ζ are defined and can be used accordingly during the 
decision making process.  Over time, with each path change, 
the decision makers typically become more aware and 
knowledgeable about the environmental dynamics at play as 
well as the degree of influence these dynamics have on the 
situation and the path. 
Accompanying every course of action is the passage of 
time and, with each passage of time, a new measurement of 
success relative to the goal is established. The results of these 
measures are highly reflective of the environmental dynamics 
at play during each specific time frame. In addition, these 
results influence the next course of action to take in reaching 
the end goal. As time passes and the results of successive 
measurements in response to changing environmental 
dynamics are evaluated, a point is reached whereby a decision, 
or set of decisions, must be made to keep the organization on 
track toward its goals. The decisions made at these points in 
time influence the direction of the next course of action in 
reaching the end goal. 
Following each decision, a new set of OBs and a new ζ are 
defined. These new values are reflective of the changing 
environmental dynamics, course and distribution of outcomes 
during the passage of time up to the decision making point. 
Furthermore, these intermediate results strengthen the decision 
maker’s awareness and understanding of the environment, as 
well as the uncertainties and risks that accompany the 
environmental conditions.  
Following a course of action based on heightened 
awareness and understanding of the environment typically 
affords two effects.  First, generally, there is a decrease in risk 
due to the attainment of more extensive knowledge, which 
causes a reduction in ζ.  Second, ζ will tend to rotate toward the 
goal, unless something else has changed in the environment. 
This process, reduction and rotation of ζ, continues until the 
end goal is reached or until one gives up and terminates the 
project.  If this process is observed until the end goal is 
achieved, as stated earlier, the actual path will be longer than 
the original projection.  This longer path corresponds to the 
passage of more time than the hypothesized ideal path. 
Figure 1 illustrates this conceptual process, where P1 is a 
point in time whereby a decision is made to change course. The 
decisions made at P1 should factor in this new information and 
knowledge about the environment, which will create the new 
pair of OBs and a new ζ. Each blue line illustrated in Figure 1 
represents the implementation of a different course of action 
and the time that passes during the course of action. 
Surrounding each blue line is a pair of red lines, which are 
illustrative of the new OBs at that point in time.  This 
representation allows managers to graphically see the 
relationships between their decisions and their goal.  
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III. ZETA 
Although the exact shape and characteristics of the outcome 
distribution are not known, a multitude of exploratory 
questions can be asked of the situation in order to gain greater 
insight into the shape of the probable outcome 
distribution.  The first area of consideration shall be a focus on 
whether or not the distribution is symmetrical or asymmetrical 
around the mean.  Outcome distributions that are symmetrical 
in shape suggest that the outcomes on each side of the average 
would be equally likely to occur.  However, and arguably so, 
this is not realistic for most organizations and metrics given the 
dynamic environmental conditions.  In many realistic 
situations, decision makers have observed that obtaining 
outcomes closer to the OB adjacent to the goal, rather than the 
one furthest way, is much more difficult to 
achieve.  Furthermore, many variables that effects ζ, such as 
cost and quality, are non-linear and non-symmetrical in shape 
across the possible outcomes within the distribution. 
Consequently, decision makers are pressured to identify how 
far skewed the outcome distribution is away from the original 
goal.  The potential implications resulting from this as well as 
strategies for reducing the potential adverse effect of the 
outcome distribution will be discussed later in future papers. 
In order to identify the rough characteristics of the outcome 
distribution, influencing factors affecting ζ should be 
considered and analyzed accordingly. When analyzing the 
individual factors that influence ζ and their potential impact on 
reaching the end goal, decision makers must examine which 
factors can result in not only adverse outcomes, but also 
favorable outcomes with relatively low costs and relatively 
higher efficiencies.  In other words, some influencing factors 
will have a minor or varying effect on ζ and the outcome, 
whereas others will have a significantly large impact. Factors 
that influence ζ at a relatively small degree can simply be 
ignored, whereas factors of greater influence capacity must be 
taken into consideration when making decisions. The key, 
however, in optimizing factors with strong influence capability, 
is to identify precisely what those factors are and leverage them 
appropriately. 
Changing one of the factors that contributes to ζ can have 
two effects.  The first is a reduction in ζ, which corresponds to 
a reduction in the risk or a compression of the 
distribution.  This can ultimately lead to a path that brings an 








or a path that moves in the opposite direction of the goal.  For 
example, a decision maker can pursue a strategy that minimizes 
the total risk of the path, however, in doing so, the potential for 
high rewarding outcomes is likely diminished, thereby making 







The second effect is a rotation of ζ in either an 
advantageous or disadvantageous direction with respect to the 
goal.  This rotation represents a changing of the distribution in 
some fundamental way.  Both of these effects are graphically 
represented in the True North Plot (Figure 1) and the Goal 
Boundary Plots (Figures 2 and 3). 
As a result of the necessity to shift in response to changing 
environmental dynamics, risk assessment and estimation are 
crucial in minimizing risk and uncertainty while maximizing 
the potential for a successful outcome. 
Rigorously determining ζ is a relatively challenging 
process.  However, calculating a rough estimation of ζ by 
analyzing, interpreting and synthesizing the characteristics of 
an outcome distribution is critical. 
IV. COMPARING AGILITY 
Course changes need to occur for a number of reasons, 
notably because of the dynamic shifts within the external and 
internal environment, or to improve the rate of travel toward 
the goal. Thus, the ability of a firm to effectively respond to 
dynamic shifts by changing paths lends credibility toward the 
conception that organizational agility is paramount in creating 
competitive advantages, particularly ones that leverage 
technological innovation. There is considerable evidence, 
produced through research, asserting that a linkage exists 
between the agility and the competitiveness of an organization 
[2].  
For incumbent enterprises, path changes can result in 
internal destruction and a pronounced disruption to the 
equilibrium entrenched within the internal organizational 
environment.  Consequently, incumbent firms are often 
reluctant to change paths in response to environmental changes 
because of the potential for internal disruption that stems from 
rigidity and deeply rooted operating customs [1]. 
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Let us now comparatively review how organizational 
agility affects the rate of progress toward goal attainment.  This 
comparison will encompass two different companies operating 
in the same industry and market while sharing a common goal 
and starting point.  However, these two companies are different 
in that one is relatively small and agile while the other 
company is relatively large with less agility.  In other words, 
each set of OBs and their corresponding ζ are independent. 
For illustrative and comparative purposes of these two 
companies, Figure 4 displays the paths of the small and agile 
company as well as the path of the large and less agile 
company.  In this comparative review, the small and more agile 
company displayed in Figure 4 shall be named Company A and 
is represented as such by the green line.  The large and less 
agile company displayed in Figure 4 shall be considered 
Company B and is represented by the blue line.  The green and 
blue lines that represent the course of action during the passage 
of time are both surrounded by their respective OBs at each 
point of evaluation of the path function. 
As time progresses, both companies reach decision making 
points and each company makes their own respective decisions 
based on the internal and external environmental dynamics and 
the measures of success relative to the end goal.  At the 
decision point, the companies can decide to stay on the same 
path, pursue an alternative path or quit altogether.  If the option 
of quitting is not taken, then the process of time passage, 
measuring results, establishing new OBs and a new ζ, and 
making decisions continues to occur repeatedly for each 









As shown in Figure 4, Company A initiates its first decision 
and executes the first change of path, whereas Company B 
decides to continue on the same path for a longer period of 
time before making a path change.  As illustrated in Figure 4, 
the effect of agility on organizational efficiencies is 
compounded as time progresses.  Although Company B holds 
relatively the same awareness and understanding of the 
environmental dynamics at play during the beginning, 
Company B decides to remain on the original path much 
longer.  Thus, Figure 4 is intended to demonstrate that smaller 
companies with higher agility levels (Company A), relative to 
larger companies (Company B), are able to respond with 
greater speed and efficiency.  In the example, the 
environmental factors have held constant, but this agility effect 
produces even more benefits when these factors are allowed to 
vary, which is representative of the real world. 
In the case of Company A and Company B, Company A 
comes closer to reaching the goal much faster and at a lesser 
cost than Company B as a result of staying on track and 
reducing their respective ζ faster than that of Company B. 
Reaching a goal relatively quickly while decreasing 
uncertainties, risk and related costs simultaneously are all 
derivatives of efficient decision making, which stems from 
organizational agility. 
So far, in this example, the nature of the overall 
environment has not been discussed for either company’s 
products and processes.  At a more granular level, 
organizational agility can be seen in how products and services 
in general evolve in response to environmental change.  In 
addition, organizational agility is seen in the reengineering of 
processes, procedures and systems that are intended to support 
a company’s products and services operations. Assumptions of 
clear and stabilized product concepts and related specifications 
do not tend to work effectively in environments characterized 
as turbulent [2].  For example, according to Thomke [2], 
organizational agility inherent in product design represents two 
types of agility, one of which includes process range whereas 
the other is process mobility.  Process range, according to 
Thomke [2], is the typical result of having flexible technology 
in place to support easy adaptation into other products in order 
to reduce overall product design times. 
Process time reduction, on the other hand, often translates 
to overall cost reductions [2]. Practically speaking, when the 
time and cost of changing a product’s design is high and low, 
respectively, the design flexibility is often defined as low and 
high, respectively. Time and cost reductions stemming from 
flexibility are advantageous and tend to bring exceptional value 
to a company in the form of risk minimization and efficiency 
maximization. 
As depicted in Figure 4, Company A could have a 
relatively high degree of design flexibility, which allows for 
fewer time and resource requirements and related constraints. 
These constraints can be burdensome to a company’s ability to 
reach the market quickly enough to reap healthy returns on 
investment and to create and sustain a learning environment 
that occurs in real time.  A correlation exists with a firm’s level 
of flexibility and the firm’s performance.  As seen with small 
and more agile firms, such as Company A, the ability to 
quickly produce innovative, cost-effective and market 
satisfying products and services to consumers is positively 
correlated with the level of agility the company has as well as 
the relatively smaller ζ.  Thus, given the agility factor, start-ups 
and other companies in their early stages of growth are better 
positioned than larger, less agile companies to bring 
technology innovation to the market faster and at a lower cost. 
While they might start out with a larger ζ than incumbents or 
larger companies, they have the ability to reduce ζ much more 
quickly.  Another way of looking at this is that agile companies 
have the ability to “learn” faster. 
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V. COMPARISON OF INCUMBENTS AND NEW ENTRANTS TO 
A MARKET 
Larger and less agile companies, referred to as incumbent 
enterprises [3], often experience significant challenges with 
technology innovation and often face declines in performance 
[3]. Declining performance in the wake of technology 
innovation for incumbent enterprises is purportedly due to two 
leading factors, which include differing economic incentives 
and the forces of inertia [3]. For incumbent enterprises, the 
economic incentives for embracing and leveraging technology 
innovation are lower and less attractive than for entrant 
enterprises. In comparison, for entrant enterprises, these 
economic incentives are much higher because of their higher 
agility capabilities [3]. Inertia, which is known as 
embeddedness, is the second factor proposed by Hill and 
Rothaermel [3] as attributing to performance declines among 
incumbent enterprises in the wake of technology innovation. 
Well established firms, through their experience over time, 
have a naturally reduced ζ.  They are not very aggressive at 
making path changes; when they do make changes, they are 
small incremental changes.  This causes a small rotation or 
reduction in ζ, but not much of an actual change in direction. 
New entrants, on the other hand, have a much larger 
ζ.  Generally, new entrants are trying to maximize the 
likelihood of an outcome that would be to the extreme of the 
distribution of an incumbent enterprise.  Maximizing the 
likelihood of an outcome by entrant firms is achieved through 
initiating disruptive changes to the underlining 
variables.  Entrant firms also make path changes more rapidly 
because of the reduced cost of change and smaller company 
inertia.  Therefore, the combination of quicker path changes 
and the shifting of the market by disruptive innovation are very 
effective for new entrants while, for the incumbent firm, these 
external forces can rotate their ζ away from their goal. 
VI. TYPES OF INNOVATION AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO 
ZETA 
 The types of technological innovation and their use within 
the incumbent and entrant firms will now be discussed.  
Macher and Richman [4] state that successful incumbent 
performance in the wake of technology innovations is the result 
of discontinuous innovation, which is generalized in literature 
to encompass two types of change, one being radical and the 
other being architectural.  However, Macher and Richman [4] 
argue that discontinuous innovation “unsurprisingly contrasts 
with ‘incremental innovation’ or ‘sustaining innovation’, which 
typically introduces relatively minor changes to existing 
products, exploits the potential of established designs, and 
reinforces the dominance and capabilities of incumbent firms” 
[4].  Paralleled with Hill and Rothaermel’s [3] definition of 
radical innovation, Macher and Richman [4] state, “radical 
innovation requires knowledge that is usually based on 
engineering and scientific principles that are unfamiliar to 
incumbent firm” [4].  Whereas, architectural innovation leaves 
the core components of a system untouched, radical innovation 
usually connects individual pieces of technology together as a 
way of reengineering a system or a process that is supported by 
a set of core components [4].  
In contrast to the common theme of declining performance 
among incumbent enterprises that face technology innovation 
are the entrant firms, who do not face the same set of 
challenges with technology innovation.  Findings from research 
conducted by Macher and Richman [4], suggest that entrant 
enterprises achieve victory in most of the technology battles 
even though the incumbent enterprises have a significantly 
larger pool of resources, experience, market presence, market 
influence, and stability. While these characteristics have 
numerous advantages for incumbent firms, they can also work 
to the disadvantage for incumbent firms with respect to 
innovation in technology.  Accordingly, entrant firms are 
arguably better suited than incumbent enterprises to develop 
and commercialize technology innovations because of their 
smaller size, minimal historical events that create precedents, 
fewer regulatory and business requirements, and fewer 
commitments that exist in incumbent firms [4].  Technology 
innovation often places intense competition between incumbent 
enterprises and entrant enterprises [4].  However, regardless of 
the competition stimulated by technology innovation, there are 
a number of factors, as described in the preceding sections of 
this paper, aimed at reducing the anticipated performance 
decline of incumbent enterprises, thereby reducing their risk 
[3].  As mentioned earlier, the key to building and sustaining 
organizational agility to support healthy internal change and 
development begins with evaluating the dynamics of the 
external and internal environments as well as the interplay 
between the two sets of dynamics.  Proactively scanning the 
environments for changes in dynamics positions companies to 
consider potential downstream effects that may occur.  These 
potential downstream effects may occur as a result of a 
decision as well as for the purposes of developing contingency 
plans necessary for addressing issues upon decision 
implementation.   
Assessing the environment starts with gaining awareness of 
what dynamics exist in the environment, the degree to which 
they can shift, and the potential impact they can have on the 
organization. 
There is increased attention placed on how these two types 
of technological innovation, incremental and discontinuous, 
impact ζ.  As time progresses, ζ will decrease and rotate toward 
the goal in the presence of incremental or sustaining 
innovation.  However, as a company or product matures, the 
incremental improvements will continue to become smaller 
over time.  As the incremental improvements become 
continuously smaller, as shown in Figure 3, ζ will continue to 
decline accordingly.  Often, companies that employ an 
incremental innovation strategy never reach their end goal and, 
instead, reach a barrier in which further improvements in 
technology become increasingly difficult to apply.  
Furthermore, an incremental innovation strategy can also result 
in a dead end or limit a company’s ability of introducing and 
embracing technological innovation.  Conceptually, 
incremental technological innovation runs parallel to the 
colloquial expression of “low hanging fruit” in that relatively 
simplistic innovation strategies may produce significant 
improvements in the beginning.  However, the magnitude of 
the improvements becomes continuously smaller and harder to 
obtain over the passage of time.  As the magnitude of 
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technological improvements becomes increasingly smaller over 
time, a company’s ability to compete and survive through the 
use of technology innovation becomes severely impaired.  
The use of a discontinuous innovation strategy, on the other 
hand, generally produces different results for organizations. 
Discontinuous innovation entails a sudden, or radical, change 
in the rules or methods and modes of operation within a 
company.  Radical change within an organization can bring 
drastic effects on variables including ζ and the time scale as 
well as environmental dynamics.  
The effects of discontinuous and continuous innovation are 
supported by the illustration contained in Figure 5, whereby the 
blue line symbolizes a company applying a continuous 
technology innovation strategy and the green line symbolizes a 
company applying a discontinuous technology innovation 
strategy.  For the company applying continuous innovation, ζ 
becomes increasingly smaller over the passage of time between 
P1 and P2 continuing on a rotational path towards the end goal.  
Figure 5 illustrates the learning process that a company 
experiences when a continuous technology innovation 
approach is applied.  As time progresses, during continuous 
innovation, the company learns how to operate and produce 
more effectively and efficiently.  The shrinking and continuous 












In contrast to the blue line, the green line represents a 
discontinuous approach to technological innovation. With 
discontinuous innovation, the company begins at the same 
point as a company taking a continuous innovation approach. 
However, companies using a discontinuous approach are able 
to jump the curve and end at P1’ instead of P1.  Although the 
company represented by the green line takes a continuous 
approach to innovation following this movement off of the 
original path, the discontinuous approach places the green line 
company far ahead of the blue line company.  In short, a 
company that follows a continuous path of technological 
innovation generally operates within their OBs, whereas a 
company that follows a discontinuous path implements a 
course change thereby jumping onto a new path.  
As discussed in preceding sections of this paper, incumbent 
firms tend to focus on incremental innovation, whereas new 
entrants tend to embrace more disruptive and discontinuous 
approaches to technological innovation.  
VII. COURSE CORRECTIONS 
Based on this framework, the optimal time for a course 
correction remains a critical question.  However, before this 
question can be addressed, the cost associated with a course 
correction must be calculated or, at least, reasonably estimated. 
In actuality, there are many small costs that must be considered 
in aggregate for a course correction.  For example, retooling or 
changing the configuration in a production facility represents a 
large change and, probably, a relatively large aggregate cost 
will be associated with that change.  Other changes like product 
positioning, marketing or new product creation will have very 
different costs.  If the expected benefit yielded from taking a 
particular course change is greater than the costs then the 
change should be pursued and will be discussed in more depth 
later in this section.  This relationship between cost and benefit 
will define the optimal time for evaluation of a course 
correction. 
For example, an incumbent enterprise might have a larger 
cost due to inertia associated with a course change when 
compared to a smaller and more agile firm.  As a result, 
incumbent firms, faced with the effects of inertia stemming 
from a lack of organizational agility, pursue avenues to 
minimize course corrections as much as possible.  However, 
pursuing these paths, at the expense of potentially value added 
benefits gained by the organization making a course correction, 
might, in fact, contribute toward performance decline.  
In order to understand the costs in connection with course 
corrections, the factors that contribute toward these costs must 
be determined.  These costs will often depend upon a variety of 
factors including, but not limited to, industry factors, a 
company’s business model, supporting financing and capital 
structure, and market conditions.  For example, a major 
reengineering of a product, process or service may carry a cost 
that is relatively high.  Conversely, the course correction could 
consist of a change in the marketing mix with no incremental 
cost.  In some situations, one course might eliminate or restrict 
future options.  In this case, the opportunity cost of these 
options must also be considered.  
Mathematically, the Course Change Coefficient (CCC) is 
quantitatively defined as the ratio of change in the expected 
outcomes during the optimal evaluation cycle time (ΔECT) to 
the total cost of making the change.  The cost of making the 
change is referred to as the Total Cost of Correction, or TCC. 
The formula for relating these two values is below in Formula 
1.  
Formula 1: CCC = ΔECT / TCC 
If the CCC calculation yields a positive result, then the 
course change is advantageous to the company.  In contrast, if 
the calculation yields a negative result, then the course change 
is to the disadvantage of the company.  As previously 
discussed, there are often a number of course correction 
choices that have smaller costs.  While some may assume that 
pursuing the course of action with the smallest cost is the most 
advantageous outcome, this is not always correct.  The reality 
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is that the outcome that maximizes CCC, despite cost, will 
have the highest projected return and should be selected. 
While TCC is challenging to estimate and calculate 
accordingly, ΔECT is a more difficult value to estimate and 
calculate.  To illustrate this difficulty in calculating the ΔECT, 
the first step in the calculation process is to define a time 
period for evaluation of the change in outcome.  Too large of a 
time value for the calculation of ΔECT will mean a change is 
always considered as too small and will lead to rejection.   
Some executives might think of using company’s break-
even criteria for evaluating projects as the correct value for 
ΔECT.  However, this will almost always be too conservative.  
While the discussion of how to pick the optimal ΔT will be left 
for another paper, the process of picking a reasonable interval, 
given a company’s history, industry and other factors, is not 
difficult. 
For some time interval, ΔT, the ΔECT can be calculated by 
first evaluating the projected value of the course function 
before and after the change over ΔT and then finding the 
difference.  This is represented graphically in Figure 6.  
 
As can be seen from Figure 6, the effect of the change with 
a cost of TCC is represented by angle b.  Therefore, firms are 
really trying to find the maximum of Δb/TCC.  In other words, 
firms are looking for the largest incremental change in b for the 
lowest cost (TCC).  ΔT is related to ΔECT by: 
Formula 2: TAN(a+b) = (A + ΔETC)/ ΔT 
Formula 2: ΔT = (A + ΔECT)/ (TAN(a+b)) 
Formula 3: ΔT = (A+ ΔECT)(1-TAN(a)TAN(b)) / 
(TAN(a) + TAN(b)) 
VIII. SHIFTING ENVIROMENTAL CONDITIONS 
A common mistake that occurs, particularly with 
incumbent enterprises, is that decisions are made based on the 
assumption that the environment is stable and constant.  
Consequently, the uncertainties and risks inherent in the 
environment go unnoticed and unaccounted for, often resulting 
in performance failure.  Continuous directional shifts in paths 
could serve as evidence that environmental instability and 
discontinuities are trying to be minimized by the firm.  
To illustrate the point that the real world is made up of 
constantly shifting dynamics, consider two identical 
companies, Company C and Company D.  In an ever-changing 
external environment, Company C and Company D have 
started in opposing directions as shown in Figure 7.  Although 
the two companies start out and proceed on different paths, 
they both reach the common end goal in the same amount of 






However, if conditions shift to the left, then the company 
that started out to the left can execute a directional shift in its 
path and reach the goal much quicker than the other company. 
As a result of this directional shift in path, Figure 8 depicts a 
substantially shorter distance and earlier achievement of the 








The point is to illustrate that an external shift in the 
environment can change not only the OBs and the position of 
the goal, but also the direction of progress without any 
additional costs being incurred.  Unfortunately, the opposite is 
also true.  This tendency for a given environment to shift is 
called environmental volatility.  An environmental shift is 
represented in our model by a rotating of the axis (Figure 8).  
IX. STRATEGIES 
While there are an infinite number of potential strategies, 
this paper will focus on three strategies; two extremes in the 
incremental innovation situation followed by the discontinuous 
situation. The first, on the incremental side, is where a 
company tries to hit their goal with the minimum number of 
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course changes (one).  To use a nautical term, this is called 
“Banging the Corner” (Figure 9).  
“Bang the corner — to sail all the way to or beyond the 
lateral extent of the racecourse (where the extended laylines 
from the weather mark and leeward mark cross) in search of a 
(usually mythical) strategic advantage.  Banging the corner 
eliminates any advantages possible from wind shifts; lifts are 
no help to you and headers help every other boat but yours. 
Also called “going to Cornersville,” “Rightsville,” or 
“Leftsville,” where the population is usually 1. British and 









As stated in the definition, this strategy has a couple of 
weak points.  First, it maximizes the risk of being on the wrong 
side of a shift if environmental conditions change.  This means 
that, if a shift occurs, there will either be a huge advantage or 
loss.  Since most companies are not gamblers by nature, this is 
a very unattractive and risky way to proceed.  Second, this 
strategy assumes that the company can make a major change to 
get back on course, which is doubtful.  From an alternative 
point of view, if a company could make such a major change in 
order to gain improved conditions, the question arises as to 
why the company would not have taken such an approach 
earlier.  An earlier change would almost certainly have a higher 
CCC and, therefore, should be implemented.  While this 
strategy tries to minimize the cost associated with a change, it 
increases risk.  This strategy also reinforces the status quo.  
Companies with large amounts of inertia may follow this 
strategy either intentionally or unintentionally. 
The second extreme is when a company makes changes all 
of the time in an effort to always be on the direct path.  This 
strategy is coined the “Middle of the Road” strategy (Figure 
10). 
Meaning: Something unadventurous or inoffensive; opting 
to go neither one way nor the other. 
Origin: This phrase conjures up similar images to that of 
'sitting on the fence', i.e. portraying something that is not sure 
enough of itself to go one way or the other. It seems a rather 
odd choice of words to describe something that is bland and 







This strategy can also be proven to be far from optimal.  In 
this situation, one is constantly incurring costs associated with 
constant changes.  While these costs, if considered separately, 
look small, they can add up in aggregate.  The biggest risk is a 
competitor will make changes more aggressively and gain an 
advantage.  This could substantially limit options and increase 
risk.  The key to picking the right strategy is to know the 
environmental volatility and the risk profile to decide how far 
one can stray from the centerline. 
The last scenario to consider is to try and jump to a 
different curve through discontinuous innovation.  This 
situation is shown graphically in Figure 7.  In a sense, this is 
changing the rules of the game and then trying to capitalize on 
the results.  Traditional incumbents overstate the risk of this 
strategy and choose a more conservative path as discussed 
earlier in this paper. 
In summary, the optimal strategy has several components, 
which include a constant evaluation of their ζ, risk profile, 
CCC and position.  The key is to know the firm’s location and 
the cost to make a change at all times.  The second component 
is to always look for ways to innovate.  With incremental 
innovation, one can positively affect ζ in both magnitude and 
direction.  With discontinuous innovation, one can move to a 
more advantageous path.  Therefore, the key is to build a 
culture that is constantly looking at both types of innovation. 
X. CONCLUSIONS 
The framework presented in this paper provides a graphical 
representation of the relationship between the starting point, 
current location and end goal for a company.  Furthermore, the 
framework quantifies a confidence interval that defines the 
probable location of the future path at a given point in time, 
including the likely location of the future path following a 
course change.  The confidence intervals and measurability of 
uncertainty and risk obtained by evaluating the angle ζ between 
the two OBs at various points in time are advantageous features 
of the framework. This graphical representation of the situation 
coupled with the distribution of possible outcomes provides 
managers with the information necessary to evaluate changes 
in path. 
Combined, organizational agility and organizational 
competitiveness have the effect of making the less agile, or 
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incumbent, enterprise less likely to change paths.  As a result of 
anticipated apprehension around potential disruptions to 
internal organizational equilibrium, upon the introduction of 
technological innovation, incumbent enterprises choose not to 
change paths and typically experience a longer path toward 
reaching the end goal.  The effect is compounded over time 
and, on average, corresponds to a longer path for the incumbent 
than the new entrant.  For entrant firms, the situation is the 
complete opposite.  This is due to the entrant firm’s ability to 
exercise agility in changing course midstream in order to 
accommodate rapidly changing environmental dynamics. 
Furthermore, the entrant firm does not experience significant 
equilibrium disruption as compared to the incumbent firm.  The 
model presented in this paper illustrates the faster learning 
process that entrant firms, or more agile firms, experience 
when faced with the need to apply technological innovations 
within their respective organizations.  As illustrated by the 
model, the faster the learning experience occurs, the quicker 
the reduction in overall ζ.  
As discussed in preceding sections of this paper, there are 
advantages and disadvantages associated with incremental and 
discontinuous approaches to technology innovation.  As for 
incremental innovation, the disadvantage is that applying a 
strategy that is exclusively incremental can potentially result in 
the organization reaching a barrier, or limit, to further growth.  
This is due to the incremental benefits from each pivot 
becoming increasingly smaller until there are no additional 
benefits to be realized.  Discontinuous innovation, by contrast, 
enables a firm to jump off their current path in a radical 
manner.   Applying a discontinuous innovation strategy enables 
the firm to leap ahead of competitors while also defining new 
markets.  For the incumbent firm, the internal disruption 
stemming from radical changes to embedded processes, 
procedures, systems, attitudes and beliefs can outweigh the 
benefits.  
The optimal time for a course correction is a balance 
between the total cost to implement the change and the 
expected incremental benefit to the path.  Quantitatively, this 
relationship is defined as the Course Change Coefficient (CCC) 
and is the ratio of the change in the expected outcomes of the 
total cost of making the change.  Calculating the CCC reveals 
valuable information such as whether a particular path change 
is going to prove to be advantageous or not.  It also provides 
for a comparison between two considered path changes.  
Although estimating the total cost in most situations is 
relatively simplistic, the process of estimating the appropriate 
time interval for evaluation purposes is not.  
The reality of the external environment, in which 
organizations operate, is that the environment is constantly 
changing.  A common mistake among incumbent enterprises is 
that decisions regarding paths and course changes are based off 
of assumptions that the external environment is stable, 
predictable and constant.  Stability, predictability and 
continuity are not realistic representations of the external 
environments in which companies operate today, particularly 
for companies operating in highly competitive and technology 
driven industries.  Changing environmental dynamics, as 
represented in the Path/Goal Model, are shown by the rotation 
of the landscape.  Depending on the direction of rotation 
relative to the firm, the environmental dynamics will produce 
either an advantageous or disadvantageous effect. 
While there are an infinite number of possible strategies, 
looking at the two extremes provides managers with significant 
insight.  For instance, if a company pursues a position to 
minimize path changes, then they encounter the “bang the 
corner” risk where an environmental shift may catch them on 
the incorrect side of the rotation of the landscape.  In contrast, a 
company who attempts to stay in a neutral position, or in the 
middle, is continuously changing paths.  This strategy often 
results in a high aggregate cost. The optimal strategy has 
several components, which include a constant evaluation of a 
company’s ζ, risk profile, CCC and the position relative to their 
goal.  In other words, to achieve an optimal solution, 
companies must remain aware of their true positioning and 
their respective costs for instituting change as well as the 
possibilities for discontinuous innovation.  
The Path/Goal Model is designed to factor in these 
variables and produce a quantitative result which allows 
managers to evaluate the available options, select the best 
strategy, drive the company forward and, ultimately, reach the 
firm’s goals.  
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